Chapter 19
The Hidden Theology in the New Naturalisms

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Abstract In this chapter we place contemporary naturalism on its proper intellectual ground. We maintain that naturalism is not a scientific hypothesis, it says nothing original about nature. Nor is it a philosophical thesis, except as natural theology. In fact, under the naturalistic label a series of doctrines about the (non) reality of God are grouped. That is, the adequacy of naturalistic ideas must be discussed within the territory of theology, to which these doctrines belong. From here, we draw a classification of naturalisms according to whether their theological outlook is more or less liberal. The strictest versions admit only an atheistic theology. Others would also accept deism. Some, more liberal, are also compatible with pantheism or even with panentheism. Only an extremely liberal version of naturalism would be compatible also with a theistic theology, but it is worth questioning whether in this case we could properly continue speaking of naturalism.

Keywords Radical naturalism · Radical ecologism · Scientism · Anti-theism · Ananthropic universe

19.1 Introduction

Current science-based naturalism rarely contributes positive original ideas. Its several varieties only share one distinctive characteristic, namely, their refusal of theism. Consequently, in its contemporary renditions, naturalism becomes mainly a theological thesis. On the other hand, in its process of radicalization, the ethically-concerned ecological naturalism also tends towards theological stances, either pantheistic or animistic. Our purpose in this chapter is not so much to argue about

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L. Valera (ed.), *Pantheism and Ecology*, Ecology and Ethics 6,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40040-7_19

naturalistic positions as to place them in the field of research where they belong. They do not belong in the field of science and, in the field of philosophy, they contribute very little to ontology, epistemology, and ethics. In fact, they contain notions that should be discussed in the field of theology since, in the long run, they deal mostly with the existence of God, the possibility of knowing God and the relationship God may have with human beings and with the world. So much so, that it may be possible to suggest, as we will do further on, a classification of current naturalisms in view of their respective theological stances, depending on whether they seem to be liberal or if they only admit to an orthodoxy that may range from atheism down to animism going through agnosticism and pantheism. Later, within theological research, someone may wish to rate their merit. But this last step lies beyond the scope of this chapter.

19.2 Naturalism and Natural Sciences

Describing naturalism is not an easy task since, in fact, there is no clearly defined version of naturalism. There are several varieties of a doctrine whose borders are rather blurred. The very fact that a good part of contemporary philosophy has taken *naturalism* as a kind of inescapable tenet has fostered the multiplication of *naturalisms*. In other words, because naturalism is taken for granted within some philosophical circles, differences among philosophers in those circles –regardless of how deep they really are– end up appearing as varieties of the same doctrine. And as differences among philosophers are never few, varieties bloom everywhere. A century ago, the philosopher Roy Wood Sellars (1922, p. vii) stated that "we are all naturalists now." And he added immediately: "But, even so, this common naturalism is of a very vague and general sort, capable of covering an immense diversity of opinion" (Sellars 1922, p. vii). We might think that in our times, naturalism is still the main philosophical orthodoxy. But naturalism remains as popular as it is diffuse.

19.2.1 Everything That Exists Is Natural

As a first approach we may say that naturalism holds that *everything that exists is natural* (Pérez 2021, 2022a). Let us begin with an analytic approach to this central statement of naturalism: "everything that exists is natural," which implies that whatever exists is natural and only what is natural exists. The thesis has two parts: it affirms all what exists is natural and denies the existence of anything that might be extra-natural. So far, the simple semantics of the statement.

Further, if we add some of the historical and pragmatic context, naturalism strongly denies not merely the extra-natural, but very specially the supernatural. It is not worth devoting too much time to this point. It is obvious that the whole poetic folklore of fairies, dwarfs, and goblins, as well as the ridiculous game of flying

teapots and spaghetti are not the real issue. In this discussion, they are mere decoys. Here we are dealing with the supernatural and, especially, with God.

What do naturalists say? Two things: that the natural exists (which is so obvious that nobody questions it), and that God does not exist. The statement about the existence of nature cannot be taken as a statement belonging exclusively to naturalism but is a commonplace where most philosophies agree (acosmism would count as the one exotic exception). So, exactly what is current naturalism about?

About denying the reality of God. Namely, we are talking about theology. In fact, the main obsession of strong naturalism is the denial of the reality of God, especially the denial of a God as creator and provident. Its main tenet, therefore, is a theological thesis: God does not exist and, if he did exist, he would have no connection with nature or with the human being. The tendency of strong naturalism to deny or devalue freedom and human subjectivity is derived from this theological thesis (Pérez 2018).

In general, naturalism has closer links to theology than to natural science, despite what naturalist authors themselves usually say. On one hand, sciences do not need naturalism and they derive no benefit from it. On the other, naturalism does not need sciences although at the moment it is trying to feed off their prestige by adopting scientific apparel. In other words, all things being equal, should naturalistic philosophy disappear scientific activity would not be concerned at all; there would still be scientific research of the same quality as current research. Natural sciences have no need at all of naturalistic philosophy. Besides, naturalistic philosophy does not even need the existence of natural sciences. It is true that in its scientist version it refers to them and, somehow, feed off their prestige. But well before modern science was born there were naturalistic thinkers, also called materialistic (Soler 2013). Should our civilization pay no heed to natural science, philosophers would still be able to promote naturalistic ideas in non-scientific versions. And if there ever was ancient science, it was not carried out by the most naturalistic thinkers. Rather, precisely the less naturalistic ones were involved in it. Greek astronomy has clear roots in Pythagoras and Plato, biology has Aristotelian roots, while atomists or sophists, closer to naturalism, made scarce contribution to natural science.

The argument may be applied to almost every period in history (Arana 2020, 2021, 2022). If Aristotle wasn't a radical naturalist, Galileo, Descartes, Kepler, Leibniz, or Newton were much less so. Neither Lavoisier, founder of the new chemistry, nor the creators of the synthetic theory of evolution would claim to subscribe to strong versions of naturalism. Neither were evolutionary biologists and geneticists Ronald Fisher, Theodosius Dobzhanky, nor Francisco Ayala. Much less so was the proponent of the cosmological theory of the Big Bang, Georges Lemaître. And coming to a more recent field, the past director of the Human Genome Project, Francis S. Collins, would not rate himself as a naturalist in a strong sense either. One might dodge our line of argument with the assertion that, in fact, these outstanding scientists –from Aristotle to Collins– did not fully understand the philosophical implications of the natural sciences they worked on and, in some cases, even founded. But it would be a hard stance to maintain because in most of the cases mentioned –if not all– we are talking about thinkers who reflected expressly on the philosophical consequences of their scientific findings. Of course, many other

scientists, current or historical, would back naturalism in philosophy. Nevertheless, historical evidence proves that natural sciences and naturalistic philosophy are mutually independent.

Such independence does not apply regarding naturalism and theology. In this case, connections seem to be strict. In fact, the theological condition of naturalism allows us to work out some gradation of its variables. We might list naturalisms according to how liberal they are as regards theology. We would have a distribution of the different versions of naturalism: some strict or orthodox, others more liberal regarding theology.

To begin with, there is a peculiar version of naturalism that denies the existence of nature itself. We might say: *naturalism without nature.* It is wonderfully expressed in the verses of Alberto Caeiro, one of the heteronyms of the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa (2010, p. XLVII): "*Vi que nao há Natureza, que Natureza não existe, que há montes, vales, planicies, que há árvores, flores, ervas…*" ("I saw there was no Nature, that Nature does not exist, that there are hills, vales, plains, that there are trees, flowers, herbs…"). There are natural things, in the sense that they are born and die, but they do not come from the same hand, they do not make up a whole, they do not form a system, nothing unites them, not even supposedly natural laws. If we insist on seeing them as a real and true whole it is simply due to some kind of "*doença das nossas ideias*" ("Disease of our ideas," Pessoa 2010, p. XLVII). This nihilistic version of naturalism requires atheism as its theological counterpart. It seems quite clear that it is not compatible with theism in its traditional format, but neither with pantheism. In both cases, some kind of unity and order of the world are presumed. In the case of the former, that unity and its order correspond to creation and providence. In the latter, the unity of the world and its order are due to the identification of nature with God, a God that is strongly rational at times (such as in the pantheisms of Spinoza or Einstein). But in the words of Pessoa (2010, p. XXVII), "*Só a Natureza é divina, e ela não é divina…*" ("Only Nature is divine, and it is not divine…"). It is questionable if this version of naturalism is compatible with polytheism and up to what point, but it seems clear that it does not fit with deism: the most important "task" of the deistic God is to order the world in a particular way. And the only way to know him is through rational knowledge of that way (it is a God of reason, of strictly natural theology, not revelation). On the other hand, it seems clear that such a version of naturalism is incompatible with natural science itself – a science that tries to obtain a scheme, either of the order which things work out among themselves, or else of the invariant relationships among them that allow us to speak about the existence of laws. Briefly, this nihilist-style naturalism would be strictly related to atheism as a theological stance.

19.2.2 Strong Ontological Naturalism

A second version of naturalism would be *strong ontological naturalism.* It is scarcely liberal as regards theology as well, though slightly more open than the former. Ontological naturalism says that only the natural exists; therefore, it denies

the existence of a transcendent God. Despite which it leaves open a space for the tenet of pantheism. There is no God beyond this nature that accounts for it or explains it, but what if God is nature? What if we attribute some of the traits of divinity to nature? This type of naturalism seems to be compatible both with atheism and with pantheism, although obviously not with theism, deism, or panentheism (it seems unlikely that an ontological naturalist would accept a transcendent dimension such as that stated by panentheism).

19.2.3 Epistemological Universal Naturalism

The theological consequences of a third version of naturalism, based on epistemology, are like those of ontological naturalism. We mean *epistemological universal naturalism*: it holds that there is no knowledge besides that of the natural sciences. This type of naturalism is equivalent to *scientism*. As we said above, its consequences are like those of ontological naturalism: we only know through the instruments of science, so there is nothing like a transcendent God. But there is no objection to equating all that knowledge with God. Therefore, we may think that universal epistemological naturalism, compatible with atheism, also opens the door to pantheism, but it would hardly be compatible with panentheism, let alone with theism (there is nothing in science like "the transcendent").

19.2.4 Epistemological Naturalism

A fourth kind of naturalism, that we may name *local epistemological naturalism*, states that in some places -as science or philosophy- we must stick to the epistemological methods of natural science and only to those, because they are sufficient to provide a full explanation. If I am devising an experiment with a particle accelerator, for example, it makes no sense to address God at all. The theological consequences of local epistemological naturalism are different to those described above because, insofar as it professes some ontological agnosticism, it is far more liberal. We may consider it is compatible with atheism, agnosticism, pantheism, and deism. But it is unthinkable that this naturalism may be compatible with panentheism or with theism. It is not compatible with panentheism, because the knowledge of the transcendent dimension of nature is ruled out by science's methods. And it is incompatible with theism because, at its core, theism holds that God is the cause that explains reality. It is not that a theist wishes to bring God into the experiment of the particle accelerator but as, from God's perspective, the natural world has been caused by God and is providentially governed by God, a "full" explanation of the world would require, in the long run, an appeal to God. It is not that God must be introduced into science but the scientific explanation of nature, if it sticks to local epistemological naturalism, cannot be complete in some rational, relevant, or

ultimate sense. For example, we have performed an experiment in the accelerator with no need to appeal to God, but then we might still ask: which conditions of reality have permitted to carry out this experiment, where does the order that makes it possible come from, why are human beings, in some way or another, able to understand or know reality at such a profound level as the one we find in the particle accelerator, why can mathematical tools devised beforehand by humans describe reality so precisely? All these questions surpass the realm of science, but they are also senseless in a philosophy that follows this type of naturalism.

19.2.5 Heterodox Naturalism

Lastly, we can talk about a fifth kind of naturalism. It would be more liberal than the previous one and, maybe, some may not even rate it as an authentic naturalism. In any case and in view of the current lines of the debate, it might be seen as a *heterodox naturalism*. It would be compatible with any idea of God, from atheism through theism. This kind of lenient naturalism limits itself to state the reality of nature and the importance of natural sciences, as well as the notorious interest of their results for philosophical research. It would consider that there can be no good philosophy if the results of natural sciences are ignored, let alone ignoring natural reality. It must be clear that this naturalism does not appeal to or necessarily end in the theistic idea of God, but it does not deny it *a priori*. It is as liberal as possible because it does not prejudge, rather it leaves it an open issue. In view of this, we might call it a-theological naturalism. Not because it denies theology; rather, it does not claim to have a theological solution from the start; that is, it is not essentially a theological thesis, as seems to be the case –somehow or other– with the other naturalisms. This open version of naturalism is attractive since it acknowledges the dynamics typical of nature, as well as the importance of natural sciences. And it achieves this with no need to make any theological commitment.

Briefly, we have a kind of nihilistic unscientific naturalism that leans towards atheism. Classifying it under naturalism is almost an overstatement since while it states the reality of natural things, it denies nature itself. At the opposite end we have a naturalism that is compatible with science and totally liberal in the field of theology. We subscribe to it, but some would hesitate before classifying it as fully naturalistic because they hold that the adjective should be reserved for philosophical doctrines that include –explicitly or implicitly– a theological commitment. These are the blurred borders of the naturalistic palette. In the centre, in the range of the undoubtedly naturalistic, we would have the ontological and epistemological varieties, which open up the possibility of pantheism, despite being deeply refractory to all varieties of theism.

19.3 Naturalism and Ecological Consciousness

Besides reflection on natural sciences, the other great agent for the introduction of naturalism in contemporary thought is ecological consciousness. Following this line of development, naturalism seems to be a doctrine whose main component runs along theological lines –be it pantheist/panentheist (Valera and Vidal 2022) or animistic.

Ecological consciousness belongs within the scope of practical reason, beyond ontology and epistemology. It includes knowledge of the ecological situation of our planet, as well as about the impact of human actions on it. This consciousness functions prescriptively as well as descriptively. Ecological consciousness aims to tell us what we *must* do as to our relationship with nature. It soon becomes an environmental ethics.

There is no reason why environmental ethics should result in any theology in particular, but that is how it has happened. This is due to the initial view of the ecological issue as a problem with intrinsic value (inherent, or in itself).[1] There is an intention to base ecological ethics on the inherent value, not of the human being but of nature as a whole or on the value of some natural beings. Anthropocentrism was left out from the start as a possible ground of environmental ethics. Biocentrism or ecocentrism have occupied that place. In fact, many thinkers have held that the ecological crisis was caused precisely by the anthropocentric mentality. Anthropocentrism has been systematically accused of devaluing all other beings, up to the point of conceiving them as mere instruments in the service of humans. Most environmental thinkers have understood that it is necessary to change the focus of ethics, the grounds of value, and place it in nature. Nevertheless, between this move and the divinization of nature itself there only is a very small step. And that step seems compulsory if we expect to acknowledge moral proposals, without handing everything over to pure and irrational emotivism.

Insofar as environmental ethics may wish to displace human beings from the centre, it will be seized on by pantheistic theological stances. In other words, nature will have to become divine: *Deus sive natura.* Otherwise, where would we find moral guidelines? Obviously, not on the grounds of its usefulness for humans, or based on the feelings humans may have, or social agreements they may reach. Any of these would lead us to fall again into reviled anthropocentrism.

Some environmental thinkers are more explicit in their pantheism. Among others, it must be examined as an implicit tenet or modified in panentheistic shape. Atheism and theism are excluded from any non-anthropological thinking in environmental ethics. The former, because it would either cancel any foundation of value, or it would lead us back to anthropocentrism. The latter, in view of its immediate connection to the special dignity of human beings, created in the image of God and after God's likeness, and destined by God to keep and care for the rest of

[1] These words are not strictly synonyms. However, they can be read as such in our argument, with no specification of different hues.

creation. In other words, among all things created, theism attributes special value to human beings. Consequently, a firmly anti-anthropocentric environmental ethics must be anti-theistic as regards theology.

However, it must be noted that an anthropocentric environmental ethics is open to theism but not tied to it. If it were stated in an anthropocentric key, it would lack strict theological implications. It might find backing in usefulness, feelings, consensus, deontology or in the dignity of human beings as creatures of God. Utilitarian, emotivist, contractarian, deontological formulae have their own virtues and defects; they may prove more or less efficacious, more or less reasonable, but they lack direct theological implications; they are compatible with atheism and deism. Moreover, so long as they are not absolutized, they can ground their sensible statements in the theistic notion of God. Anthropocentrism is also compatible with theism, as we have seen. But anti-anthropocentric environmental ethics nails its colors to the mast of a pantheist theology. Thus, it becomes theology.

Something similar might be said about animalistic variants. In their most radical versions, they have already gone from saying that the human being is an animal – where they might easily coincide with Aristotle, Saint Thomas, and Darwin– up to stating that human beings are *nothing but* an animal. All three would probably disagree with such statement. It must be noted that the passage from the first to the second statement is a logical fallacy. C.S. Lewis is said to have named "nothing-butterism" this peculiar inclination to fall into this kind of fallacy. In fact, this inclusion of humans among all animals may have two very different practical readings. The first one is truly alarming and can therefore be left aside. While the second one, morally more acceptable, surely leads to animistic theological stances.

According to the first reading, human beings are animals and may be treated as such, because their value is relative and gradual, not absolute. There can be no reference to human dignity as thematized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Accordingly, some human beings would be more valuable than others, just as we admit that some animals are more valuable than others (in fact, nobody demands the same treatment to a dog and to a sponge). If a human being were nothing but an animal, we might scarcely refer to the dignity of the most vulnerable and dependent human beings. And claiming a species barrier would be inconsistent with anti-speciesism. We should simply acknowledge that some human beings are more valuable than others. That is what Peter Singer does at different points of his work (Singer 1993, pp. 169–173; Marcos and Pérez 2018).

Should many people find it difficult to acknowledge this harsh moral stance, alarming for most, we might choose the second, kinder, reading of course. If we assimilate humans to all other animals, we might think that there is some kind of absolute value among the latter, some kind of animal dignity; in other words, that their life is as sacred as human life. It is not easy to put this moral conviction into practice: it would lead us to offer equal treatment to all animals. On the other hand, the restriction of the dignity of the animal realm will soon be questioned, since there are good arguments to posit that there is intelligence and sensitivity in the realm of plants too (Mancuso and Viola 2015). However, it is not the intention of this work

to criticize animalistic ideas, but to reveal their deep theology –in this case, as animistic, because they lead to sacralization of all animal life.

Might we still develop an environmental ethics completely liberal regarding theology? From our point of view, yes. It can be done, precisely, if an anthropocentric stance is acknowledged, which does not exclude –rather, it grounds– the intrinsic value of all natural beings. Another point: without some anthropocentrism, the inherent value of natural beings would either decay or would have to find some backing in pantheistic or animistic theologies.

Let us see what anthropocentrism has to say. The human being, not in general but in the actual person of each one of us, has some kind of special value which is incomparable, non-negotiable, immeasurable, absolute; in a word, what we (following Kant) call dignity. And what is it that anthropocentrism does not say or imply? It does not say that all other beings lack their own value; it does not state that all other beings are mere instruments in the service of human beings. How can we harmonise anthropocentrism with the inherent value of all other beings? Hans Jonas (1985) shows us the way. But let us begin by stating the complexity of the case before giving it an answer.

Robin Attfield (2018, pp. 48–50) connects the birth of environmental ethics with a thought-experiment proposed by Australian philosopher Richard Routley who in 1973 proposed *the last man thought experiment*. If only one human were left on Earth, aware that he himself will die soon and with him, the entire human family, he might arbitrarily damage all other living beings, even putting an end to them, with no human being hurt. Even so, according to a commonly shared moral intuition, the free harm caused to all other living beings would not be ethically correct. Why? It may be because we acknowledge intrinsic value in all other living beings, besides the instrumental value they may have for us. Environmental ethics developed from these grounds. Biocentric and ecocentric ethics appeared to challenge traditional anthropocentric ethics (Attfield 2018, pp. 74–76).

We begin to see the problem that many find in anthropocentric ethics. It is not a problem connected to ethics, but to anthropology. Anthropocentrism is only wrong when it is associated with an erroneous idea of human beings. What if, everything considered, human dignity was compatible with the inherent value of all other beings? And if it were precisely humans who confer value, if it were humans who illuminate all other beings, who transmit intrinsic value to all? Should we not then be anthropocentric even in environmental ethics?

Let us consider another thought experiment that both takes a step beyond the previous one and in fact gives it its sense (Marcos 2021). Let us name it *the ananthropic universe thought experiment.* Let us now eliminate the last person. There are no human beings in the universe, there never were and never will be, there is not even any chance of their ever existing. We are in an *ananthropic* universe. How would value be distributed in such a world? Is there anything wrong about a black hole absorbing a star or a complete galaxy, should such items exist in our fictitious universe? An *ananthropic* universe is a universe lacking any possibility of value. Except, of course, if the universe itself were God (pantheism) or if some of the existent nonhuman beings were divine (animism). Besides, this second mental

experiment grants sense to the moral intuition that emerges in the first one. *The last human being should not damage their surroundings because those surroundings make possible the existence of human beings.*

If we wish to instil some value in the universe, without falling into animistic or pantheist stances, we should reckon with the (possible) presence of human beings and with an anthropology of each person's dignity. If we acknowledge the infinite value of every person, an absolute value, then we may acknowledge the intrinsic value of all other beings. In order to know how to go about it we will have to go back to Jonas (1985, p. 7): "Insofar as it is the fate of *man*, as affected by the condition of nature, which makes our concern about the preservation of nature a *moral* concern, such concern admittedly still retains the anthropocentric focus of all classical ethics."

Once the absolute value of human life has been established, however, all other beings do not become mere instruments. They also have their own value since the sheer possibility or capacity of value is a value in itself. It is a line of metaphysical grounding of value in being. Thus, Jonas clears the way that leads from *is* to *ought* with no need to go through the naturalist fallacy. In his own words: "The ontological idea generates a categorical, not a hypothetical, imperative" (Jonas 1985, p. 43). So,

> it is important to see that the mere fact of value (with its opposite) being *predicable* at all of anything in the world, whether of many things or a few, is enough to decide the superiority of being, which harbors that possibility within its manifold, over nothingness, of which nothing whatever, neither worth nor worthlessness, can be predicated. […] The capacity of value (worth) is itself a value (Jonas 1985, pp. 48–49, italics in the original).

This last sentence is the keystone. Based on it, an anthropocentric ethics becomes perfectly compatible with acknowledging the inherent value of all beings. It actually grounds such acknowledgement.

If we admit the dignity of each person, we should acknowledge the value of natural beings which make the existence of humans on Earth possible. We inhabit an anthropic universe, hospitable to humans, to an infinitely valuable being. Therefore, the sheer possibility of this universe to host human beings is an intrinsic value of such a universe. And the same can be said about each being in that universe. Its value does not depend on their being instrumentally *necessary* for our life, but on the fact that they make it *possible*, and that possibility is already a value we cannot rate as instrumental. It is an intrinsic one, because it happens regardless of whether there are human beings *de facto* or not.

Now we might enquire about the grounds of human dignity. And the reply would follow the Kantian line of autonomy. It would remind us of our common belonging to the human family, along the line of UDHR or it would use notions such as "image and likeness." In other words, an anthropocentric grounding of the value of natural beings may also find several different groundings. It is perfectly compatible with a theistic vision of God, the universe, and the human being, but it does not strictly depend on it. Therefore, it may achieve social consensus over and above religious beliefs.

On the other hand, when we try to find a biocentric or ecocentric grounding one of the following may happen. Either the inherent value of natural beings remains hanging over, with no rational justification. Or the inherent value of natural beings is founded on the divine condition of the entire universe or some of its parts. Here we face a clearly theological grounding, which should not act as a political argument. It is not legitimate to impose some kind of State pantheism, nor, of course, to turn animism into an official religion. What we have just said is not political fiction. Some countries have already courted with imposing pantheism as the State religion. And in others there are political parties that experience such a temptation. Among the advantages of the anthropocentric stance defended in this paper, there is one which is non-trivial: it allows us to acknowledge the inherent value of natural beings with no need to combine religion and state.

19.4 Concluding Remarks

The project of naturalizing philosophy, so widely circulated currently, is mainly theological both in its scientist and its ecological versions. There is practically unanimous agreement about at least part of the naturalistic proposal. That consensus goes well beyond the boundaries of naturalistic schools. Consequently, it cannot be taken as its own and distinctive part. Practically every sensible person admits to the existence of natural beings, that they are valuable and that they consequently deserve some respect, that nature has its own dynamics, and that the findings of natural science must be earnestly considered both for philosophical research and in order to reach practical decisions. Up to this point, naturalisms agree with common sense and hold widely shared ideas. The distinctive and exclusive trend of naturalisms comes to surface when each adheres to a particular conception of divinity: from strict and practicing atheism up to animism, going through the different bypaths of agnosticism and pantheism. And all of them, as a group, reject theism. If we wished to summarise it in an oversimplified formula, leaving variables aside, we would state that *naturalism is the word currently used for anti-theistic theology*.

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